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An author of popular fiction claims that a Boer visionary who died in 1926 foresaw
the release of Nelson Mandela. A South African Police lieutenant colonel who is a
veteran of the security branch is visited by an angel, who commands him to organise a
national day of prayer and peace. A member of the South African Defence Force
general staff tells an Evangelical congregation that he and his soldiers successfully
caused a drought in Namibia to be broken by organising a prayer meeting.
These are only some of the extraordinary manifestations of
religious experience which marked white South African response to the upheaval of
democratisation. This paper will argue that,such phenomena need to be the subject of
serious study if we are to come to grips with the way in which whites dealt with the
end of the racial state. In recent years, secular South African critical intellectuals and
social scientists have virtually ignored the socio-political significance of religion. This
has left the oppositional study of religion in the hands of religiously affiliated
intellectuals, whose apparently socially based studies of religion are really theological,
ahistorical and lacking in sociological sophistication. Both of these groupings have
little or nothing to say about the fundamentalist and apocalyptic variants of
Christianity, despite the obvious significance of these strands of belief in
contemporary South Africa. This paper sees religious discourse as having been a
crucial framework within which white South Africa has tried to make sense of the
dramatic social changes which have recently occurred. The very depth of these
changes has given the more 'extreme' strands of religion a popularity as a language
within which to discuss them. In the paper, I will present a framework of sociological
analysis within which these phenomena can be understood. I will then provide a set of
case studies of dramatic contemporary religious manifestatioa I will also suggest that
the common assumption of both secular and religious intellectuals that the
fundamentalist and apocalyptic strands in South African religion are necessarily
reactionary is wrong. The paper does look at one example of prophetic discourse
aimed at opposing change. But it also looks at other cases in which religious,
'extremism' has adapted to, or even actively encouraged, change. The suggestion is
that the discourses of the same theology can be adapted to a wide range of social
purposes. In this sense the debates of liberation theology against religious
conservatism are sociologically literally pointless, insofar as both sides of the debate
assume that a particular set of theological ideas lead automatically to a certain kind
of social practice. This, I will argue, is far from being the case. '"•"•
Social Science and the Mvth of Secularisation
In South Africa, as elsewhere, secular intellectuals find enthusiastic religion an
embarrassing topic to discuss. From the vantage points of the left party branch
meeting, the Sociology common room or the editorial offices of the Weekly Mail it
seems very difficult to take seriously people who believe that the Holy Ghost is
causing them to speak in tongues, that the Virgin Mary or Archangel Gabriel has.
addressed them or that miraculous healings take place. But the reality is that
multitudes of people do claim such experiences and that millions more base their
conceptions of themselves on the veracity of such claims. Far more people find such
ideas attractive than are drawn to Marxism - Leninism, Sociology, or radical
journalism. Because of our scepticism toward religious experience, as secular
intellectuals, we screen out the whole realm of irrational belief. Yet it is decisive for
an understanding of the lives of people in contemporary society.
Behind the scepticism of the secular intellectual lies one of the great sociological
myths - secularisation. Marx of course held that the development of class
consciousness would free the working class from the ideological bondage of religion.
Weber, despite bis elegiac sadness at the prospect of bureaucratic rationality
replacing the richness of spirituality and tradition, saw this process as ultimately
inevitable. Even Durkheim, the Sociological founding father most attuned to the
social centrality of religion, believed that the bonds of belief linking society together
would come to take the form of a recognition of economic and civic inter-
dependence, rather than any reliance on the supernatural. In this sense, all three
theorists remained the heirs of the enlightenment: ultimately reason would be
victorious.
But secularisation has been subject to massive empirical disconfinnation. (Thompson,
1992) While it is true that in fairly few societies a single faith grips the totality of
society, beliefs based on the supernatural and the irrational have flourished.-
Protestant revivalism in the U.S., evangelisation by both Protestant Christians and •
Moslems, Islamic and Jewish fundamentalism are all major features of the
contemporary world. So are new religious cults and occultism. Social theory and
social theorists are ill-equipped to.deal with these realities. At least superficially,
current religious developments give comfort to post-modernist theoretical positions
which dispute notions of direction in historical development, and the possibility of
sociological explanation.
However, this paper does proceed from the perspective that sociological explanation
of religious phenomena is in fact both possible and helpful: What secular
sociologists and historians need to add to their approach, however, is a willingness to
recognise the intensity and depth of religious beliefs and their importance in
channelling people's actions in society. To a considerable extent this willingness to
acknowledge the experience's social significance is found in Weber's work, especially
his great book on the Protestant Ethic. Within such an approach the tools of
classical sociological inquiry • a Marxist focus on class relations, Weberian attention
to organisational and bureaucratic interests, Durkheimian concern with 'collective
representations', remain-central to the sociology of religion.
Durkheim's contribution to the study of religious extremes is particularly highlighted
in a fascinating study by Stepan Mestrovic of the apparition of the Virgin Mary in
Medjugorje in Croatia during the 1980's, which he links the appearance to the social
crisis associated with the impending disintegration of Yugoslavia. For Mestrovic, such
events are a "typically fin de siecle phenomenon that binds the people who will live
through the coming of the century with the previous century's revolt against
modernity, and subsequent guest for faith."(140) Mestrovic reminds us of Durkheim's
view of religion as a Veil founded delirium" -" a reality that must be taken seriously".
He praises Durkheim for recognising religion as a collective, social product. This
points to the problem of the secular intellectual confronting enthusiastic religion - he
or she tends to be interested in the question of whether a mystic is mad or sane,
honest or lying. But, says Mestrovic, this deflects us from what is sociologically
interesting in such phenomena. Religious 'experience' does impact on responses to
social action. We need not necessarily pursue the rigid anti-psychologism of
Durkheim's Rules of Sociological Method in order to adopt such a position. We may
indeed legitimately investigate the motivations of particular individual seers - but that
does not resolve the problem of why people respond to a particular religious message.
Mestrovic urges us to apprehend religion as a system of representations that betray
"something about the 'collective conscience' of a particular society". (160)
The psychological level of religious apparitions and miracles involves a much less
clear cut distinction than straight forward sane/mad or true/lying distinctions would
suggest. As Mestrovic argues, the whole burden of Freudian psychology points toward
the constant crossing of boundaries between the conscious and the unconscious. Not
only is it the case that in dream-states, schizophrenia and drug induced experiences
we encounter unconscious phenomena as part of the consciously perceived world;
many of our most minor daily behaviours represent the triumph of unconsciously
rooted habits over reason.
William James great work "The Variety of Religious Experience' points in an
extremely perceptive way to why religious 'delusionaiy" experiences should be so
powerful: "In the religious life.... control is felt as 'higher'; but since on our
hypothesis it is primarily the hidden mind which are controlling, the sense of union
with the power beyond us is a sense of something, not merely apparently, but literally
true." (513) But James points out this can bring about actual, and not merely
delusionary changes in the personality. The person who believes himself or herself
supported by a divine force, may well become a stronger and more effective social
actor as a result. The implication is that a religious idea needs to be in assessed in
terms of its effect in action rather than in terms of fruitless speculation as to its
ultimate truth. (Durkheim coincidentally, approvingly cites James in Elementary
Forms of Religious Life (464-5), but indicates - fairly enough - that James has
relatively little to say about the social foundation of religious belief.)
South African secular intellectuals have avoided the serious study of religion. Despite
the massive following enjoyed by religious movements in the country, the assumption
seems to be that they can't be as important as 'real' secular politics. Where they do
bother to devote attention to such phenomena academic social scientists offer fairly
unsubstantiated prejudice. A researcher sympathetic to Pentecostalism (Hexham )
is perfectly entitled to point out that the few prominent social critiques of the
fundamentalist churches in South Africa are based on amazingly slight evidence.
The result is that critical discussiorfof religious movements in South Africa has •'
largely been abandoned by opposition^ social scientists and left to radical religious
intellectuals. !
The Poverty of 'Religious Studies' \
But oppositional religious intellectuals failure to provide adequate sociological
accounts of religion in South Africa is just as great as that of their secular
counterparts. It is true that over the last decade or so a considerable body of
historically and socially orientated literature on churches has been produced by South
African scholars of religion. The leading figures in this development have been John
de Gruchy and Charles Villa-Vicencio of the University of Cape Town's Religious
Studies department. Two things do need to be said in favour of this work. Firstly it
has played an important role in promoting and articulating criticism of social
inequality and oppression within the mainstream churches. Secondly it has provided
a useful documentation of debates over questions such as the need to resist apartheid,
the armed struggle, economic justice within those churches, and of church initiatives
in the political conflict in South Africa.
However, as historical sociology, this body of literature is woefully inadequate. This
is partly because it is rather uneasily poised between Theology and the social
sciences. The tendency of the religious studies literature is to articulate the Divine
Party Line on a particular question and then to wade through historical material
awarding points or demerits to religious leaders and churches on the basis of how
close they have come to the correct position. This moralistic exercise tends to
detract attention from detailed investigation of why particular religious social
movements developed and why they were able to attract support. Cochrane's (1987)
study of the 'English1 churches in the early 20th Century, for example, seems to
expend a great deal of energy in pointing out that priests and ministers in his period
were not socialists. Obviously, they weren't - if they had been socialists they wouldn't
have been likely to join the church at that time. This is not a terribly sociologically
interesting point to establish.
This asociological moralism means as well that a great deal of attention is given in
the religious studies literature to formal debates in the churches - particularly
amongst their hierarchy and intellectuals. Little is done in the way of detailed
studies on the activities of grass-roots congregations and the beliefs of their members.
The result is that the literature tends to have the same faults as studies of trade
unions or political parties that concentrate on leadership: inadequate investigation of
how far the pronouncements at the top reflect opinion, activity and people's views of
their interests at the base. Divisions which are noted are the racial segmentation of
some churches and developments such as heresies. But the scrutiny of churches as
bureaucracies exercising power would give much more interesting accounts of their
development than those we now have. The literature tends to assume that the
admirable political stands taken by some churches are the basis of their popular ' •
support - but is this so? The most popular church in South Africa, the Zion
Christian Church of Bishop Lekganya, is relentlessly a-political. The relationship
between church support and church teaching can only be determined by the study of
popular religious practice and belief, not from a priori theologizing.
The other problem which this literature faces is that its authors, erudite and
sophisticated intellectuals as they are, have exactly the same problems as their secular
counterparts with taking extreme, histrionic religious manifestations seriously. They
tend to view the claims of Pentecostals and the like with the same kind of rationalist
puzzlement as your average historical materialist would show. Yet this leads to an
odd inequality in treatment of supernatural claims. Religious studies would tend to
view askance the more spectacular claims of divine intervention by fundamentalist
Protestants, while at the same time treating the mystical claims of mainstream
churches with circumspection. There is after all nothing intrinsically less plausible
about the Pentecostal's claim to be entered by the Holy Ghost and caused to speak in
tongues than in Anglo-Catholic's and Catholic's belief that the communion bread
literally becomes the body of Jesus Christ. The only difference is that the former
position enjoys less social prestige than the latter.
The moralism and the aversion to the spectacularly deviant in religious behaviour
combines to promote a most inadequate treatment of the kind of phenomena
discussed in this paper in the religious studies literature; Firstly, despite the
spectacular growth of fundamentalist Protestantism's influence, both outside and
inside the mainstream churches, it is largely ignored. Secondly, insofar as it does get
attention it tends to be censured as reactionary, and indeed racist. Yet this is an
extremely simplistic picture of the fundamentalist churches, as we shall see. In the
South African context there has not been any one-to-one relationship between
religious fundamentalism and white political reaction. Some fundamentalist
tendencies do support the extreme right, while others have gradually adapted to
change or actually been quite critical of the apartheid legacy. The problem is that
the religious studies scholars proceed as if you can extrapolate a clear set of political
actions from a theological doctrine. The argument of this paper is that religion is a
form of social action and thus just as multifaceted as any other social form. The
same theology can have different consequences in different social settings. And
again there has to be a suspicion that our religious intellectuals accord a double
standard in dealing with reactionary aspects of the politics of the main-stream
churches. The South African Catholic Bishops Conference seems to have avoided
much flack despite its horrendous views on gender, sexuality and reproductive rights,
presumably because the religious intellectuals like its views on (?) "more important"
(?) political questions.
Thirdly, the religious studies literature, with its liberationist tendency, offers little
explanation as to why fundamentalist and apocalyptic beliefs have grown so strong,
not only amongst relatively privileged but also amongst racially oppressed South
Africans. Racial oppression explains why about five million black South Africans
organise themselves in separatist churches. It does not in any simple way however,
explain why those churches are predominantly churches of withdrawal from the world
and quasi-Pentecostal theology rather than adherents of the liberation theology
advanced by the (actually smaller) mainstream denominations. And here perhaps
the difficulty that religious intellectuals face is that they do not want to face the fact
r
that it is precisely the sort of secularly based erudition which people like them have
which tends to drive a wedge into churches between the followers and the leaders.
Through great internal struggles religious intellectuals can create religious schemes
which reconcile their beliefs with their secular education. But this produces an
intellectualised and non-mystical Christianity which has little popular appeal. As
Gramsci points out, for any social movement, the key "problem is that of preserving
the ideological unity of the social bloc which that ideology serves to cement and unify.
The strength of religions has lain in the fact that they feel very strongly the
need for the doctrinal unity of the whole mass of the faithful and strive to ensure that
the higher intellectual stratum does not get separated from the lower." (328) A
century of critical theology has allowed just such a threatening gap to open up
between the popular faith and sophisticated theologians within mainstream
denominations. The fundamentalist preachers may defy reason, but this is at least
more consistent than traditional denominations' attempts to reconcile tradition and
rationality. It is the breakdown of the link between intellectuals and masses which is
key to the international decline of mainstream Protestants and the ascendancy of
Evangelicals and Pentecostals.
Religious Change: The Fragmentation of Afrikaner Solidarity
Why should white religious experience be characterised by the 'extreme' phenomena.,,
discussed in this paper at this particular time? The answer needs to be sought in the
impact of three social forces. These are: the fragmentation of Afrikaner social
solidarity; cultural globalisation; and the crisis of the apartheid system in the 1980's
and early 1990's.
During the 1950's and 1960's Afrikaner nationalism achieved a remarkable degree of
hegemony over Afrikaans speakers. Seldom in the past had the fractious volk been so
united. But the National Party leadership was now able to use the resources of state
power to provide welfare and civil service employment for the white poor, business
opportunities and senior civil service posts for the aspirant bourgeoisie, and
educational expansion to guarantee upward social mobility and thus the expansion of
a new white middle class. By providing for the needs of the whole Afrikaner social
spectrum, the Nationalists constructed a class alliance of workers, fanners, civil
servants and business people under the leadership of skilled nationalist ideologues.
This alliance was further cemented by the elaboration of an extraordinary network of
women's, youth and cultural organisations which created a life-world in which
Afrikaner people's experience was constantly moulded by nationalist ideology and
thus by Apartheid doctrine.
But by the late 1960's this apparently invincible block of social classes was beginning
to break up. Afrikaner business leaders had made such strides in the boom of the
1960's that they were no longer as willing to subsidise scarce and expensive white
labour through the job reservation system (which restricted certain categories of work
to whites). They began to call for apartheid policy to be weakened in order to make
greater use of black workers in skilled jobs. The National Party leadership, which
had itself undergone a process of embourgeoisement, began to show sympathy to
these calls. For the hard-core of the white working class this was a betrayal. By
1969 the Herstigte Nasionale Party had split off from the NP and during the 1970's it
steadily gained support, especially from poorer whites, for its defence of classical
Verwoerdian apartheid. By the early 1980's, discontent amongst the Afrikaner •>
electorate had spread much further, especially as a result of the limited reforms of
the early P.W. Botha era. White Labour was feeling threatened by the effective end
of job reservation and the legalisation of black unions and permanent black
urbanisation. Civil servants were concerned that their jobs would be threatened by
the restructuring of apartheid policy. A new and more free market economic
ideology in government began to erode the massive subsidies that white agriculture
and white welfare services had enjoyed from the state, increasingly turning the less
affluent farmers of the north and the urban white poor against PW Botha. On top of
this, the slump of the 1980's generated large scale white unemployment for the first
time since the Great Depression.
Expression was given to all these discontented forces by the emergence of the .. • ..
Conservative Party (CP) in 1982. It rapidly became the predominant party of the
white right and by the late eighties its support stood consistently at about 30% of the
white electorate, or about 50% of Afrikaans speaking voters.
Yet the decline of the NP's traditional base was not simply an economic, but also a
cultural phenomenon. The Afrikaner yuppies who emerged in business, the media
and the professions during the 1970's and 1980's were far less connected to the grass-
roots than the previous generation of Afrikaner intellectuals. Better educated than
their predecessors, they aspired to international acceptability and were mortified by
the isolation that apartheid brought on them. They flirted with 'radical* cultural
influences which challenged the doctrines of the Afrikaner cultural establishment.
Integrated increasingly into the world of big business, they tended to be far more pro-
capitalist than the old Afrikaner populists with their quasi-socialist rhetoric from the
1930's. These professional, managerial and capitalist strata were increasingly the key
influences on the NP. They were the supporters of the verligtes (enlightened ones)
who attempted to reform and restructure apartheid in the 1960s. Although (with the
exception of a few brave intellectuals), they did not break with the NP and apartheid,
they did tend to favour the ending of racial discrimination in the social and economic
spheres. By and large they nevertheless supported the NP's maintenance of white
political power through the 1980s.
This new social group was both unable to offer less affluent whites the economic
goods they desired and also unable and unwilling to communicate with them in the
language of traditional Afrikaner populism. Thus a cultural gap opened up, . .-.
separating (in the way that the quote from Gramsci mentioned earlier suggests) the
Afrikaner upper classes from*the popular classes. The NP no longer talked the
language of poor whites. In addition', the Afrikaner upper classes moving in a liberal
direction, met the English-speaking white upper classes moving in a reactionary
direction as change became more threatening. The NP drew increasing English
speaking support which its now 'enlightened' and thus less particularistic leadership
felt quite comfortable to accept. But for the Afrikaner right this change was good
material to work with - they could point out that the NP was diluting its Afrikaner
identity in order to hobnob with what they portrayed as the Anglo-Jewish business
establishment .
In the religious sphere this had definite implications. For most of the century,
Afrikaner religious allegiance had gone overwhelmingly to the three Calvinist
churches, despite minor challenges from other Protestant denominations. But the
social trends we have been discussing undermined this hegemony . To a limited
extent, the Afrikaner upper classes became less dominated by the NGK and the
other Calvinists, some splitting toward the more up-market end of the fundamentalist
religious spectrum. More typically though, the affluent Afrikaners remained with the
traditional churches, especially the NGK. The NGK came to be typified by its
respectability. When I attended a service at an NGK church in a well-off suburb of
Roodepoort in November 1993,1 was struck by the relative opulence of the
congregation. Several hundred people dressed in expensive suits and (mostly) stylish
dresses packed the church which was entirely surrounded by their up-market motor
cars. The church was extremely well appointed and fully carpeted. The minister
delivered an extremely dry sermon. He discussed the crossing of the Red Sea, but
explicitly refused to draw any contemporary message from it. He emphasised the
importance of a believer's relation with God, but in a manner entirely lacking the fire
and emotional excitement with which this topic is approached in fundamentalist
churches. One was left with a strong impression of a local establishment reaffirming
its respectability. This really was the National Party at prayer.
The NGK churches tended, then, to celebrate a status quo which was comfortable
for Afrikaner yuppies but less and less so far poorer Afrikaners. More and more the
BMWs and Mercedes parked outside the richer NGK churches on a Sunday morning,
contrasted with the beat up baklries (pick-up trucks) parked outside the Pentecostal
or Apostolic churches. The NGK became the church of the establishment, losing
supporters to the Born-Again variety Christians. Furthermore, the NGK's attempts,
at the end of the 1980's and the beginning of the 1990's, to bring about
rapprochement with black Calvinists and other churches, and (retrospectively) to
criticise Apartheid, precipitated splits within their ranks. This resulted in the
creation of the Afrikaner Protestant Church, to which many CP activists subscribe.
But it also meant that many disaffected people from Dutch Reform backgrounds were
available for mobilisation by new religious forces.
Religious Change; Globalization
There have been Pentecostal and Evangelical Christian sects in South Africa for many
years. But there is a strong case that they have been given a qualitative rise in
popularity through the development of globalization of culture and the associated
impact of electronic media. Up to the 1960's the hegemony of the Dutch Reformed
Churches amongst Afrikaners prevented Protestant competitors from making great
headway. The NGK NP leadership interpenetrated (e.g. Prime Minister Vorster's
brother was NGK moderator), and reinforced one another's control. The gradual
breakup of the NP meant however that there was less effective theocratic control of
the Afrikaner electorate. And at the same time the new and more cosmopolitan
Afrikaner intellectuals were subject to an international range of religious influences.
English speaking white Protestants had, historically, been loyal to the major British
denominations, the Anglican, Methodist and Presbyterian churches. (Although Anglo-
South Africans did manage to generate one particularly extreme fundamentalist sect -
the Church of England in South Africa). However by the 1960's the South African
withdrawal from the Commonwealth began to erode the strength of Anglo-South
African cultural identification with Britain. Increasingly the influence of American
dominated film, records and print media swung the Anglo-South African mind in a
north-westerly direction.
But it was the impact of television and video which really brought about the decisive
cultural shift. The NP government had long resisted television on the grounds that it
would subject South Africans to American liberal propaganda. When the medium
was eventually introduced in the mid-1970's it rapidly became clear that local TV
production could not generate many hours of programming, and (reinforced by a
British boycott of South African TV), the SABC was obliged to fill the nation's
television sets with the likes of Dallas and Bill Cosby. I would argue that this did
have the effect of fundamentally reorientating white South Africa toward America as
its cultural exemplar. Both the English speaker's construction of the world around
Britain and Afrikaners self-imposed insularity (and incidentally Germanophilia) was
swamped by the tidal wave of Transatlantic soapies and sitcoms. This contributed in
a major way, I would argue, to an acceptance of American cultural styles and a
glorification amongst white South Africans, of the US as the high point of human
civilization. (South African troops in the Angola-Namibia was referred to South
Africa as 'the States': this horror became a Vietnam movie). TV-based
Americanophiliac culture particularly predisposed white South Africans to be a
receptive to the Televangelist' wave of the 1970's and 1980s.
The 1970s and 1980s saw emergence of the extraordinary phenomenon of the linking
of American Fundamentalist Protestantism with television as the basis of a new
religious and social movement (Wills 1990; Annerman 1991) There are two main
strands within these movements. Evangelical churches stress 'rebirth' through personal
commitment to Christ, extreme religious enthusiasm in worship, miraculous
intervention by God such as healing of the sick, and prophecy pointing to the
imminent second coming of Christ. The Pentecostals also see the world as we know it
as coming to an end, but their particular emphasis is that the Holy Ghost will enter
the faithful, especially during services, and cause them to speak in tongues. What to
the outsider is a babbie of noise is to the Pentecostal a miracle causing him or her to
speak in tongues of men and angels. Both religious groups are rooted in the
specifically American tradition: they emerged from a fusion of elements ranging from
Methodist field preaching to black American devotional practices.
The American Protestant groupings had long waged campaigns of evangelisation at
home and missionary work abroad. But none historically can have had as vast an
impact as the emergence of 'televangelism' in the 1970s and 1980s. Sophisticated
television productions and fund-raising techniques turned Pat Robertson into a quasi-
plansible presidential candidate, and gave the likes of Jimmy Swaggart and Jim &
Tammy Bakker first international fame and then international notoriety. A strength
of American fundamentalism was its diversity: although there are larger scale
Pentecostal and Evangelical church organizations and federations, the Protestant
focus on individual conscience makes for a great deal of splitting. But this in fact
means that there is a great variety of Churches. Televangelist programming is the
equivalent of flexible specialisation in industry: specific religious product can be
targeted to a specific audience.
Of course in the United States, the. televised religious movement provided a massive
platform for New Right politics which had an 'elective affirmity' with the
authoritarian and patriarchal social attitudes propagated by the televangelists. To the
alarm of the liberal-left in the US, a populace battered by stagnating living standards,
the effects of the decline of US economic competitiveness, inadequate social services
and high levels of crime and violence, and sceptical of a high handed liberal social
platitudes, were highly receptive to these messages. The Televangelists can certainly
be considered to have played a key role in finning up the ideological base for the
Reagan-Bush years.
Abroad new television technologies - video, cable and satellite networks - together
with massive marketing to local video and television industries, provided the channels
for the dissemination of U.S. revivalism. In South Africa, (despite some resistance
from NGK-aligned people in the SABC hierarchy), both U.S. produced Born-Again
programming and local Fundamentalist preachers got a growing share of the
religious broadcasting on SABC television. Even in non-denominational religious
programmes, the rhetoric increasingly suggested the Pentecostal/Evangelical
orientation of the presenters. There was a major trade in U.S. which produced
religious videos ranging from the racist outpourings of sects from the North-West US
to fairly mild and innocuous forms of Evangelicalism. Jimmy Swaggart became a
regular fixture on Bophuthatswana T.V. A number of both famous and obscure US
evangelists visited. Direct links between South African and U.S. Fundamentalists
intensified; for example South Africa's most famous Pentecostal preacher, Ray
McCauley, studied for the ministry in the late 1970's at the Rev. Kenneth Hagin
Junior's Rhema Bible Training Centre in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
The media impact of televangelism went far beyond fundamentalist churches.
Through television and media the Pentecostals and Evangelicals appealed to the
followers of mainstream denominations over the heads of their clergy. The result was
that there was a notable tendency for mainstream denominations to become more
enthusiastic in their style, and for motifs from Pentecostal and Evangelical traditions
to surface amongst the adherents of the Dutch Reformed and other Protestant
churches.
Religious Change: The Crisis of Apartheid
The third major factor which underpinned the emergence of flamboyant forms of
religious experience amongst whites is to do with the intensity of the social crisis
faced by them as the social fabric unravelled during the quasi-insurrectionary period
of 1984-6, international isolation, economic decline and the violence-wracked
transition of the early 1990s. It became increasingly apparent that apartheid was
coming to an end and with it the social political and economic protection which all
whites, but especially the less affluent had enjoyed. For a large proportion of whites
the transition seemed almost impossible to contemplate: the growing influence of
apocalyptic theology is hardly surprising when one considers that for many it was
(socially) literally the case that their world was. coming to an end. The feeling of
impending doom made a search for realignment of social and political beliefs. In a
society where religious influences were powerful this process was as likely to be
conducted in religious as in overtly political terms.
Here Mestrovic's discussion of Durkheim may be helpful. As Mestrovic suggests the
religious apparition may well be a phenomenon that holds people together in a
situation where they force drastic modernisation and change, while at the same time
expressing their anti-modernist impulses. Such religious dramas, one might argue,
enable old faiths to be reshaped to meet new circumstances. The interesting
sociological question about contemporary where South African mystics is not whether
they are personally sincere (although the ones discussed in this paper probably are).
It is rather the question of how their religious visions relate to die adjustment to
social change and why people find these visions attractive. As Mestrovic's work
would imply, South African religious beliefs do indeed betray something about
collective conscience. Or to look at it in Jamesian terms, religious experiences enable
those facing change to fortify their personalities against the experience by re-
arranging through 'twice-born' experiences their relation to the 'bidden faculties' of
their own 'hidden minds'.
At a political level this kind of reorientation could take two major forms: either
whites could attempt to pursue an overtly racial separatist politics or they could
attempt to adapt to a non-racial political order. The first option, advocated by the
right wing itself required major social and psychological realignment While the HNP
and for a time the CP advocated essentially the maintenance of the homeland system
of the exclusion of black residents from white areas, the sheer impracticality of this
option became more and more apparent It led to the emergence of support for a
smaller 'volkstaat' for Afrikaners as the preferred right wing option. This relatively
pragmatic variant of the right wing position was shown to be the most widely
supported option amongst former CP supporters when Constand Viljoen's Freedom
Front gained a majority of the potential rightist vote in the 1994 elections despite a
Conservative Party boycott. The 'smaller Volksstraat' position is one that calls for
major readjustments for right wingers. They have to face the facts that such a
volkstraat (which in any case is unlikely to be feasible at all) would have to occupy a
small area of the country and would involve upheaval and hardships for those wanting
to move there. This is very different from the claims of the more hard-line minority
to continued white control over the country. However, the position does mean that
the white right still want to emphasise white identity and the idea that non-racial
institutions are unviable.
On the other hand, the segment of white opinion which has supported - to a greater
or lesser extent - the democratisation process has also had to make even bigger
adjustments. Before the mid 1980's there was very limited support on the liberal end
of the white political spectrum for a non-racial democracy, even if there was
substantial opposition to apartheid social and economic policies. Even when De
Klerk did set about bringing a majority of whites along with a democratisation
process, many shared the NP leader's tendency to paranoia about the Communist
Party and nationalization, and (initial) partiality toward Inkartha. The massive crime
and political violence of the 1990s was extremely disorientating to this 'liberal' wing
of white opinion. However the relatively peaceful 1994 election and smoothness of
theANC entry into government was also shocking to NP supporters who generally
expected events to take a much more dramatic turn*
These different problems of dealing with political change were to an important extent
fought out culturally in religious terms. I will now turn my attention to some case
studies in point.
Adriaan Snvman's Siener Van Rensburp
The book 'Stem van n' Profeet1 (Voice of A Prophet) by Adriaan Snyman (1993) is a
classic example of the application of fundamentalist Christian and apocalyptic
discourses to support right wing resistance to current change. It deploys notions of
the special divine favour enjoyed by the Afrikaner people, together with the imagery
of the Book of Revelations, to reassure the white right that its eventual triumph is
divinely ordained. In a situation where the rational grounds for hopes of victory on
the part of the far right are exceedingly slim, such promises of a supernatural
deb'verance become, in a sense, far more plausible than more than the speeches of
Ferdi Hartzenberg or Eugene Terreblanche as a basis for hope. It is perhaps not
surprising then, that Snyman's mystical work enjoys great credibility in right wing
circles.
The central figure in Snyman's book is a turn of the century Afrikaner 'holy man',
Nicolaas van Rensburg, also known as 'Siener' (visionary) Van Rensburg. Van
Rensburg came from the Wolmaransstad district of the Western Transvaal, where his
parents farmed. He was reputed to be a visionary from an early age. But he made
his reputation during the Boer war, when he convinced a member of important
military figures, including Generals De La Rey and De Wet, of his ability to foresee
the movements and ambushes of the British. He came to prominence again in the
Rebellion of 1914, when Boer militants who refused to participate in the World War
on the side of Britain, revolted against the government of Louis Botha. Van
Rensburg has often been attributed a causal part in the Rebellion. A vision of his
was interpreted as prophesying the defeat of Britain and the German triumph, and
thus encouraged the rebels to believe they would be on the winning side. (The
'misinterpretation' of this prophecy seems to have done little to affect Van Rensburg's
popularity amongst those who believed in him). Captured by government forces :
during the rebellion, Van Rensburg was briefly imprisoned. However he was soon
allowed to return to his farm, where he remained until his death.
Since the rebellion there have been odd attempts to popularize the legend of the
Seer. (Greeen 1956) But none can have been as thorough and determined as that of
Adriaan Snyman. Snyman has done extensive research, contacting surviving
descendants and acquaintances of Van Rensburg and carrying out interviews with
them. His work was not very different from that of social historians, except for his
unshakeable belief in the prophetic meaning of the visions. Snyman's efforts were
rewarded with the finding of a researcher's crock of gold - a record of the 700 visions
which Siener claimed to have had between 1871 and his death in 1926. In the last
ten years of his life Van Rensburg's accounts of his visions were written down by his
daughter Anna, and it was these notes on which Snyman bases his interpretation of
the prophecies (together with other written and verbally transmitted visions, which
Snyman claims, 'remained alive in the mouths of the volk' 1. Much of the
preservation of material relating to Van Rensburg seems to have been the work of
one 'Oom' Boy Musmann, a friend of the Prophet who survived him until 1973.
Snyman is anxious to present Siener as inspired by God and needing to be understood
clearly within the framework of Protestant fundamentalism. In his foreword to 'Stem'
he insists that Siener was no mere fortune teller, but divinely inspired. "The Bible"
Snyman tells us, "was the only book that [Siener] ever read; he believed that his
visions came directly from God and he never concerned himself with
occultism."(p.ll) Snyman seeks to present Siener as a completely devout and simple-
hearted man of God. And indeed, the evidence cited by Snyman makes a strong case
that this was also the way that Siener appeared to his contempories. Certainly, in the
remarkable collection of photographs assembled by Snyman, Siener looks very much
the part of the Prophet; from above his vast square-cut beard (rather reminiscent of
that sported by Friedrich Engels) his eyes stare out to a point far beyond the camera.
His gifts seem to have commanded respect from his religious community; he became
an elder of the local congregation of the strict Calvinist 'Herrormde Kerk' (p.20).
Snyman is completely committed to the infallibility of Siener's visions: none of them
'has ever been shown to be wrong' (pll), and 'even learned persons at Cambridge
University in England (who had insights into his visions) would not believe that.
[Nicholaas] was an ordinary and uneducated farmer.' (p. 14).
Snyman presents Siener as the son of a sickly and devout mother and a tough
aggressive father, (p.20-21) The father according to Snyman was disappointed in
Nicholaas' lack of hardiness, and so Nicholaas was relegated to looking after the
sheep. While undertaking these duties, he had time to study the bible and learnt
much of it off by heart, (p.20-1) This presumably accounts not only for the biblical-
prophetic language of Siener's statements, but also for his understanding of himself as
the mouthpiece of God. Both Siener's self-image and Van Rensburg's presentation of
him seem to be modelled on the notion that he was an Old Testament prophet-
patriarch. !
But Snyman also emphasises the strength of Siener's Afrikaner-Republican
commitment: God was inspiring him to see into the future of the 'volk': "as a 12
year old he was already a fiery patriot to the core (in mung en been); and the older
he grew, the more strongly the love of the fatherland burnt in his heart." (p.23)
Most importantly for Snyman, the divine inspiration which van Rensburg received
points toward the eventual triumph of Afrikaner nationalism. Snyman quotes Siener
as having told a nephew, that although there would yet be greater divisions and
bloodshed than in the Rebellion '.... an unbelievable miracle will happen that
which my volk has always striven for (own republic) will be brought to fruition
(volgebring wees) and then the time of my visions will be passed '(p.23) This is the
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basis of the appeal of Siener's prophecies for Snyman. They appear to offer a divine
underwriting for the prospect of the eventual triumph of the Afrikaner right.
Snyman's interpretation of Siener leans on the direction of what one might call
Afrikaner-Israelitism. In other words he is keen to emphasise that the Afrikaners like
the Israelites of old are in special relationship to God; a chosen people, through the
pledge of the Blood River covenant. Snyman writes that "no other yelk, except Israel,
besides the Boer Nation, which has made a covenant to God. It is then coincidental
that it is precisely the Israelites and the Boers who are the two most hated peoples in
the world?" (35) He enthusiastically quotes the popular English writer, Lawrence
Green as pointing out that no where in the world except in Palestine are there as
many places and towns with Biblical names and that the Afrikaner, more than any
other people in the world command the gift of prophecy. (29)
In describing the nature of Siener's visions, Snyman refers to an account given by the
Prophet to a fellow-rebel, Harm Oost, during their imprisonment. Siener described a
pressure on the back of his head and diziness which forces him to lie down and close
his eyes. After a cloudiness passed it began " to look as clear as if I was there
myself.....": This description would seem to be consistent with the symptoms of an
epileptic attack.
Personally, Nicholaas was clearly troubled. On occasion he thought himself
confronted by personal appearances by Satan. At one point during a visit to his home
during the Boer War, Siener claimed that the devil had appear to Nicholaas and
attempted to drive him into the Wilderness, to kill himself. The devil told him that
"all the people make fun of you over those visions which you see, and no one will
ever believe you". According to Siener he engaged in days of wrestling with the devil,
ending up hospitalized with a swollen hand. But he appears to have felt confident in
his gift after that - a example perhaps of William James' favourable evaluation of the
psychological effect of being 'twice born'. That the distracted Siener entertained deep
self-doubts is understandable. What is more remarkable is that Snyman takes the
devlish appearances completely at face value.
The visions appear to have taken the form of features of Siener's daily life-world;
farm animals, household and farming implements, wagons, clothing items, guns and so
on. The animals usually appeared in a variety of colours which his followers have
taken to indicate different nations. Siener himself did not initially interpret his
prophecies, but later in life took to doing so to a greater extent.. Snyman, as his
present day disciple, has no compunctions about making such interpretations. Indeed,
a chapter of 'Stem' is given over to a table in which Snyman lays down the 'meaning'
of each of the 'symbols' in Siener's dreams. Yet Snyman's method of interpretation
seems little more than a projection of Afrikaner rightist political images onto the .
arbitrary images of the dreams. Thus a yellow dog with a white collar, is according to
Snyman, 'An Englishman with a Boer name, or a Boer with English loyalty'.
A particularly clear example of how Snyman projects contemporary right wing
phobias onto .Siener's visions is provided by one 'Siener' vision. On 30th March 1918,
Siener 'foresaw* this: "In Europe sits a little black with a dress on and dung runs off
him on the Western side". Snyman has no doubt of what this means. The little black
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is the 'Third World'; the dress signifies he is homosexual; the dung signifies infection
and the western side that Western nations will be infected. Snyman holds that, the
'prophecy' foresees the Aids epidemic and manages to condense rightist fears of
blacks, gays and the decline of Western Civilization into a single image. Snyman
leaves no doubt that he sees the epidemic as a purging of otherness. Similarly in
Snyman's interpretation of the image of a great dung-heap' in another of the visions,
is that 'Today the whole world is a dung heap - especially in Africa and the rest of
the third world'. He also notes that the prophet saw a Great Broom which would
clean the earth of 'filth' - hinting strongly that Aids is the Great Broom.
Probably the most entertainingly written section of 'Stem' is Snyman's account of Van
Rensburg's participation in the Boer War, during which Nicolaas rode with Koos de
la Rev's commando. Nicholaas did not participate in the fighting, but rather as a lay
preacher. He predicted, according to Snyman both immediate British tactical threats
to his unit, allowing them, to escape miraculously from the British. The most
spectacular claim made in the Siener legend is that concerning the escape of Boer
forces under General De Wet after being trapped against the confluence of the
Orange Caledon River by British forces. At this point, Dame Theron, the Boer's
chief scout, arrived with a letter from De la Rey to De Wet telling him that Siener
had foreseen a place where a safe crossing of the water could take place. At the
appointed spot, the Boers found that they could cross the waters on a sandbank. But
the pursuing British were swept away when they attempted the crossing. Snyman
does not miss the opportunity to point out parallels with the Israelites crossing of the
Red Sea, citing a report that De la Rey himself had made this connection. Once
more, Snyman underlines his Afrikaner -Israelitism.
The sceptic however might note that Pakenham's (1982) account of the Boer War
emphasises the superb organisation of De Wet's scouts, who may have known a thing
or two about drifts themselves, (p.447)
Siener was tragically affected by the war - two of his daughters died in a British
concentration camp. Snyman credits him with forseeing the British concentration,
camp policy as a whole, as well as his own particular family tragedy. (40-50)
Snyman attributes to Siener vision which fortold virtually all the major events of the
twentieth century; The World Wars; the Great Flue epidemic of 1918-19, and the
Russian Revolution amongst other (54-5). He claims that Siener foresaw the death
of his former commander, General De la Rey, at the beginning of the Great
Rebellion. (56-61) During the Rebellion itself he again demonstrated the power to
detect hostile troop movements, and his foretold his son's own death during the
conflict. (62-81) According to the legend as recounted by Snyman, Judge Lang who
presided over Siener's trial after the rebellion poured scorn of Siener's visions while
sentencing him. A fellow prisoner commiserated with Siener saying 'The Englishman
had his knife in you today," to which Siener is said to have responded "Ja ou Chris,
but I see them burying him". Snyman adds, dedpan, that three days, the Judge died
and was buried. Another score for divine intervention on behalf of Siener.
The powers of Siener continued into the post First World War era. Snyman even
attributes the Nationalist election victory in 1924 to him. He claims that Smuts
sought Siener's advice on whether or not to hold the election, because of his supposed
prophetic powers. Siener, who of course regarded Smuts as a traitor, advised him to
hold the election. According to the tale passed own by the Disciple Mussman, this
was because he knew through his vision that Smuts would lose. (93-6)
Siener died in 1926: but Snyman sees his visions as predicting all the major
subsequent events in South African history, whether it is" the 1961 Republic, or the
death of Dr. Verwoerd. (On the latter, Snyman follows rightist orthodoxy in claiming
that the assassination was the result of a deep-laid plot) (111-3). In approaching the
present Snyman makes a direct link between Siener and former President PW Botha.
Two visions of the collapse of a house (140-1) are interpreted by Snyman as
prophesying the role of treachery in the political demise of Botha.: Botha is presented
as the victim of the machinations of American imperialists without and liberals.within.
Interestingly, Snyman managed the solicit Botha's personal interest in his project
(pl6) and learnt from Botha that he had met Siener as a child and that he gave
Botha the impression of being one who had a calling ('"n Geroepene").
This all culminates in a vision which Snyman holds to be of the release of Nelson
Mandela. In order to understand why Snyman needs to make this type of
interpretation, one needs to grasp the psychological devestation in right wing circles
caused by the 1990 release of Nelson Mandela and unbanning of the ANC. A far
rightist Conservative M.P. who himself turned to bombing actions in response, went to
see Party leader Andries Treurnicht after De Klerk's announcement. Treurnicht
wept, and read aloud to his visitors from the book of Joshua. The M.P. comments "I
realised here is a man who does not understand the new rules of the game and is
ever more reaching back to the Bible, because a person has the tendency, when you
don't understand anymore what is going on, then you turn to a Higher Being almost
in a ciy for help and say: now I don't know." (Rapport 3.5.92) Snyman's attribution
of a vision of Mandela to Siener reflects a similar sense of religious panic to that
experienced by Treurnicht. In his vision of 8 September 1925, Siener saw an image of
a black man "his mouth opens and a goose flies out of it to the East. Then comes
another goose with the face of a person, with very long wings, its colour is white, but
the feathers are grey....... Then a train comes from the West and blacks are sitting in
it" This, Snyman asserts, refers to Mandela's release. The goose flying to the East
represents links with Communism. The second goose, he says, represents a great
increase in Mandela's power and influence. The grey in the wings shows that the
peace which this bird brings is not real or to be trusted. The train symbolises the
return of black exiles to South Africa. (117)
The Afrikaner nationalist and Biblical apocalyptic themes in Snyman's interpretation
of Siener come together in the prediction of the final triumph of Afrikaner
Nationalism. So detailed is the interpretation of Siener given by Snyman that he is
able to compile a map of these 'final' events. The annotations to the map pull no
punches: "The arrows from the coast show the flight of the English, Jingos, Jews, all
enemies of the Afrikaner ..From the States to the North [blacks] fly Southward
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At Vereeniging the enemy is finally defeated and they fly to Durban." (154) This
then ushers in an era of racist Utopia: Snyman says that Siener predicted "thousands,
of white Christians will leave Europe and stream to South Africa." However, it seems
that the triumph of the volk makes an end of history. Snyman speculates that
Siener's visions imply that the triumph of the volk will be followed by "the Second
Corning of Christ and the Thousand Year Reign of Peace". (167) At this point the
triumph of Afrikanerdom is totally identified with Christian fundamentalist readings
of Revelations. Snyman's interpretation here seems to be influenced both by
contemporary fundamentalist theology and the ideas of original Siener disciple Boy
Mussman. Mussman, was keen to link Siener's prophecies to the Book of Revelations
and its Apocalypse. Snyman quotes Mussman as saving 'Oom Nicholaas was a second
St. John and the visions that he had are a second Revelation of what will happen to
his beloved Afrikaner volk.' (27)
Snyman's revival of the Siener legend received a excited response in right wing
circles. The Conservative Party paper, Patriot (23.6.93), published an enthusiastic
review of 'Stem van n Profeet' by Elizabeth Botha. She writes that Siener's visions
"are still of relevance today", and gives particular emphasis to aspects of his visions
forseeing political divisions amongst Afrikaners - something naturally on the minds of
CP supporters. The Patriot continues to promote Snyman's book, together with other
apocalyptic literature produced by his publishers, Hugenote Publikasies of Mossel
Bay.
Snyman's book does what one would expect religious extremism in South Africa to
do; namely to provide a basis for wholesale rejection of change in the racial system.
Yet the other three examples of relgious expression which I will look at go in a very
different direction. In them fundamentalist and apocalyptic ideas are used by those
who were politically or ideologically attached to the old order, but are shifting to
encounter and even encourage the new. To some extent this may be seen as merely
necessary political adaptation for reasons of survival. But in other instances one sees
religious leaders from fundamenatalist backgrounds pushing reluctant congregants
toward greater adaptation, and thus themselves furthering the change process. I will
now discuss these case studies.
Divine Rain?
On 14th November 1993,1 attended a sermon at a Voile Evangelie Kerk (Full
Evangelical Church) congregation at Roodepoort oh the West Rand. The lower
middle class Afrikaans speaking congregation was captivated by the forceful and
eloquent preacher - Colonel Eugene Enrico of the South African Defence Force
General Staff. The billboard on the highway outside the church building advertised
Enrico's topic as "The Onslaught against South Africa". It sounded from this as if the
sermon would be devoted to Botha-era pronouncements about the Communist threat.
But Enrico's message was much more complex than that. In fact the burden of it was
the need to forsake existing racial and political divisions. Enrico shifted the 'Total
Onslaught' concept in the course of his sermon, away from the identification.of this
onslaught with the ANC, Communist Party, and foreign regimes which military
leaders like Magnus Malan had given it in the 1980s. Instead he identified the enemy
in religious terms - but terms which cross-cut existing racial political division: "It is
not the black people that are the threat (bedreiging) for us in this land - it is Satan
(dis die Satan)". He particularly assaulted racial thinking "..don't make the Cross of
Jesus Christ cheap by saying that, he died just for this race or this church..." In the
context of Conservative Party orientated western Roodepoort this was a far more
liberal message than the congregation were likely to receive elsewhere in their
community. . . - • . '
Enrico began by establishing his military credentials - an important move in a
community where most young men had been conscripted during the Angola/Namibia
conflict: he had been involved in 14 combat missions over the border ('oor die
grens'). Enrico then stressed the need for the congregation to see themselves -
'Kinders van die Here' (Children of God) - as those who should give the lead in a
'new South Africa'. He talked of the extent of crime and political violence in South
Africa, tapping into the very real fears of his audience.
The core of the sermon involved the recounting of a number of 'miraculous' incidents
in which Enrico had been involved. The underlying message was that the Evangelical
Christian had an important mission to turn to God in moments of crisis, but also
emphasised themes of racial and political reconciliation and change in attitudes.
In 1987 Enrico said he had been serving in an area near Pietermaritzburg in Natal,
where there was a massive armed conflict between ANC and Inkatha supporters. As
Enrico tells it, he was asked by his commander to make suggestions as to how to
manage the situation. In response, he set up a prayer tent in the middle of the area
in order to hold revival meetings. He summoned a meeting of black preachers and
urged them to preach Jesus in their communities. In Enrico's account, the result was
miraculous conversion. People streamed in. On the third night of the meetings 'a
black man', 'a man as big as a bear*, 'a gigantic man', stood up. Enrico recounts what
he claims to be the man's speech: "I am a freedom fighter and I came here to
destroy this meeting ... Comrades stand up",, A hundred and thirty men armed with
knives and pangas got to their feet. The man continues "But the freedom that I was
looking for I have found in this tent this afternoon. His name is Jesus. I am finished
with violence". And he throws down his knife. Enrico claims that peace then
developed in the area. He claims that the same methods brought peace in seven
different localities in Natal.
The message appears to be that the 'bear'-like and gigantic threat of black revolt can
be managed through the right kind of ideological engagement. And Enrico is
suggesting to the congregation that common religion can provide the basis for such
intervention.
The second tale recounted by Enrico concerns the way in which a subordinate of his,
a young soldier called Piet Buys, supposedly brought about the breaking of a drought
in Namibia by the strength of his faith. The story is told humorously, with Enrico
playing off Buys' extreme fervour against his own slight scepticism. Enrico's telling of
the tale is directed somewhat against himself for having insufficient faith. Enrico was
serving in the West Kavango, which was suffering under a drought of three and a half
year's duration. From Enrico's account there was a cluster of born-again Christians in
his unit, of whom Buys was one. Buys convinced Enrico to hold a prayer meeting,
saying that he was convinced that if they prayed God would give rain. A mass,
meeting of the local population - whom Enrico represents as deeply religious and
hostile to the SWAPO guerillas - was held; The rain, of course, pours down. Buys
then persuades Enrico to organise a thanksgiving meeting.-1 Masses of people from
the Kavango attend and Enrico represents this meeting as-a test of the power of God
in front of a curious audience, who can be swayed for or against the faith. Half an
hour after they pray, it rains again.
The appeal of this tale lay, I would suggest, in its giving the congregation a sense of
their ability to tackle apparently impossible tasks because of the divine support which
they enjoy. • . ••••• : • •
In Roodepoort at November 1993, this was certainly a message that many whites
wanted to hear; those who were not fanatical rightists were realising the need to
come to terms with an altered reality.
Enrico's final tale concerns reconciling with the former oppositional political
movements. In this story he is at the Admiralty in Simonstown, on the national day
for peace in 1993. He is hosting a very diverse group of politicians. Beforehand,
Enrico makes it very clear that he is deeply troubled by having to work with Moslems.
(For fundamentalist Christians it seems, other major religions, with the exception of
Judaism, are to be regarded as of diabolic inspiration). Obviously-*oo, as a former
combat officer he must have been perturbed by the presence of MK fighters. When
it is suggested that they all hold hands in a circle for peace, Enrico counters that he
will do so only in the name of Jesus. The group agrees to this and a virtual
conversion experience follows.
Of course at one level this is the worst kind of fundamentalist chauvinism. Yet in the
context of the extremely right wing West Rand, Enrico's message is much more
strikingly about reconciliation. Given the strength of black Christianity in the area,
the message is in fact much more saliemly for his audience about religious breaching
of racial and ideological division than about anti-Moslem chauvinism. He is
suggesting to his audience that it is possible to find grounds for living with the A.NC.
This is of course the direct opposite of the message which the SADF put out to the
white public during the 1980s. The an ANC government was represented as a final
doom. But now that the SADF hierarchy has cottoned on to the possibility that a
considerable portion of their power can survive the transition, someone like Enrico
feels able to urge the white populace to go along with this process of adaptation.
The Colonel's Angel
This particular shift in the religious-political discourse of the security forces is marked
even more strikingly in another case. As South Africa slithered through blood toward
the 1994 elections, a most extraordinary Revelation was vouchsafed to Police Colonel
Johan Botha of the Eastern Transvaal town of Nelspruit. By his account, an angel
appeared to him and instructed him to organise a national prayer chain. The 39-year
old Colonel Botha had served for two decades in the South African police. He had
been in the security police and had operated in Soweto for many.years,. However in
Nelspruit he was serving in the Community Relations department of the police.
(Rapport 10 April 1994) Experiencing a sense of despair about the violence in the .
country, Botha prayed to God for guidance. According to interviews given by Botha
to the press (Sunday Times 10 April 1994; Rapport IO April 1994), while his eyes ,;:
were closed, a male figure appeared before his 'spiritual eye', surrounded by a
background glow. The facial features of the apparition were not clearly visible, but
he could see that the figure had long hair. The 'angel' spoke in a loving voice. He
responded to Botha's questions as they formulated themselves in Botha's mind,
without the Colonel having to speak out loud. The apparition told Botha that people
must organise a national day of prayer. Botha responded that this was impossible.
At this point a vast lighted sign appeared in front of the Colonel with the word
"Gebedsdiensketting' (Prayer service chain). Feeling that too much was being
demanded of him, Botha burst into tears. The angel then put his arm around him
and said "What are a few tears compared with rivers of blood, my son". Botha
describes an overwhelming feeling of love. Interestingly, although in an interview
with the Sunday Times, Botha describes the messenger as an Angel, in an interview
with the Afrikaans language Rapport he confides that he believes that the figure was
Christ himself.
Botha wept for hours, and initially kept the secret to himself, feeling the task was
beyond him. However after encountering initial scepticism Botha spread his message.
He did in fact obtain a massive response. "I received nearly a thousand calls from
every part of South Africa from believers wanting to stand up and fight evil spirits
causing the violence". The national day of prayer did in fact take place and
congregations in many parts of the country participated, across the widest range of
Protestant denominations (Beeld 19 April 1994).
The Colonel's visions also seem to have had some appear for the secular Afrikaner
intellegensia. Jungian ideas seem to have a particular attraction for white South
African intellectuals, presumably because its absolutely nebulous concept of the
'collective unconscious'allows free reign to mystical speculations. A lecturer in
communications strides at the Rand Afrikaans University told the Beeld newspaper
that visions of the type experienced by Botha had enabled him to break though to a
level of the psyche beyond the personal unconscious. This was the level of "the
transpersonal psyche, the so-called 'big mind' or higher self of which the collective
unconscious is an aspect (Beeld 19 April 1994). So much for the superior rationality
of the chattering classes.
it is hardly surprising that Botha was under a great deal of strain in the pre-election
period. He had been placed in the position of attending to the public relations of a
force whose credibility with the mass of the population was virtually non-existent,
given its long time repressive role. He was having to make the transition from being
on the political front line of defending the old order to marketing the new. And the
police were taking enormous flack for their inability to control conflict. That a deep
desire to resolve the conflict affected him, and that it should be expressed in religious
terms, is understandable.
The Irresistible Rise of Rav McCauley .! • •>'•
The established wisdom of both secular and religious intellectuals in South Africa has
been that Fundamentalist churches are wholly reactionary forces. In their wrath has
been particularly focused on the Rhema Church of Ray McCauley. The allegation
has-been that Rhema - the main congregation of which is based in an enormous
church in the comfortably middle to upper middle class municipality of Randburg -
truckled to the racism of their predominantly white following and promoted a
'prosperity cult' which assuaged the guilt of its followers by assuring that their well-
being was a gift from God.
At first glance, this view seems quite plausible because Rhema has tended to espouse
the apocalyptic theology of New Right aligned American Pentecostal fundamentalists.
In a Tract 'Understanding End Time Prophecy', written by a Rhema minister
Norman Robertson (1989) and endorsed in a foreword by McCauley, the imminent
end of the world is proclaimed. Following the teaching of American 'Post-Millenial
Dispensationalists', (Wills 1990) Robertson informs his readers that prophecy points
to the imminence of the 'Rapture': all Born-Again Christians will be swept up in ah .
instant to ineetirig Jesiis'in the sky (leaving only their clothes behind!) ( cf. Wills
1990). Christ will do'this in order to spare the true believers the time of Tribulation
in which the world will be wracked with war and suffering for seven years, the reign
of the Anti-Christ (whose identity is a great source of theological speculation amongst
the Bom-Again). At the end of the seven years, Christ will return to Earth with the
angels and the Born-Again, and will wipe out the Anti-Christ's forces at the battle of.
Armageddon. The 'Oriental'^) Armies of the Anti-Christ will suffer 200 million
casualties, causing a river of blood 200 miles long in Italy. Christ will establish a
thousand year of reign of peace. The devil will be bound and cast into 'the abyss'.
At the end of the millenium, Satan will escape and raise great armies against the
faithful. But the devil and his armies will be crushed by God, and this will be
followed by the Last Judgement and the Establishment of 'A New Heavan and A
New Earth'.
In the US prophecy of this kind has had an extraordinarily strong right wing
following, extending, as we now know, to Dan Quayle and Ronald Reagan. Cold
Warriors puzzled over how war with Russia might be part of the Tribulation. Clearly
one could argue that Rhema's adoption of such beliefs tended to underwrite the fears
of its congregants and its broader public that the forces of social change in Southern
Africa represented the anti-Christ, and discouraged political engagement because of
its focus on being 'saved'. Fear of 'Oriental' armies certainly could have fitted with
the Cold War 'Total Onslaught' paranoia of the 1980s.
However this would not be a fair assessment of the impact of Rhema on politics. Its
bizarre theology did not translate in any simple way into right wing politics in South
Africa. In fact it is arguable that during the transition from apartheid in the 1990s
Rhema did in fact help move a large segment of the white middle class in the
direction of an acceptance of change. It did not. occupy the equivalent ultra-right end
of the political spectrum as its American counterparts. . . .
While during much of the 1980s Rhema was apolitical in its style, it was not
segregationist. It played a large role in establishing a network of racially integrated
religious schools, and McCauley quite forcefully defended these against attempts by
white municipalities and rightist saboteurs to get them closed down. McCauley
became increasingly willing to acknowledge that the church had failed in not more
actively opposing apartheid, developing what one of his 'followers calls 'a strange
hybrid1 of "fundamentalist doctrine and ... broadening socio-political theology" (Steele
1992). This manifested itself in the Rustenburg Declaration meeting in November
1991 where McCauley played a quite prominent role in bringing together a wide
range of churches to make a statement confessing guilt for failing to fight apartheid.
McCauley also contributed - in cooperation with recognised 'liberation' church leader
Frank Chikane - in promoting the peace initiatives aimed at overcoming IFP-ANC
conflict.
Of course, it would be perfectly fair to point out that McCauley only became actively
political at the time when apartheid was already unravelling. But it would not be true
to say that he simply followed the lead of De Klerk's National Party (NP). His
confession over apartheid and its results was much earlier and more far reaching than
NP attempts to do the same thing. He did resist considerable pressure from other
Pentecostal churches which object to involvement in the political sphere. In his
involvement in peace initiatives he seems, from Steele's (1992) account to have been
aware of the problems caused by Inkatha belligerency at a time when the NP was still
blantantly favouring Ulundi, and mainstream church activists saw his role as
constructive.
By and large there is a good case that McCauley influenced a large sector of the
white middle classes and black conservatives towards greater acceptance of change.
McCauley has an instinctive grasp of the post-modern world. Steele and he attributed
the failure of other Pentecostal churches to 'act as a voice for the nation' to their lack
of grasp of the media (Steele 1992: 105). McCauley waged an extremely skilled battle
against the NGK interest in expanding Pentecostal access to television (Steele 1992:
183-199). And he was able to deliver a very large constituency - by the end of 1991
the federal group of independent churches called the 'International Fellowship of
Christian Churches' in which Rhema is a major force. They have a membership of
about 600 churches and ministries claiming half a million followers (Steele 1992:
102).
In sum, Me Cauley"s role in the 1990s transition was quite a progressive one.
Certainly it was more so than that of many of the clergy in mainstream churches.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that threre are many aspects of fundamentalist teaching - especially
in the sphere of gender relations - which pose dangerous threats to human rights.
But if this threat is to be countered, it must be on the basis of a criticism of religious
organisations which does not stop shortly of apparently trendy - but actually equally
authoritarian and patriarchal - mainstream denominations.
Religion in south Africa is a central terrain of political, conflict. And a person's
politics is not an inevitable product of his or her theology. It is time that social scince
took the study of religion out of the exclusive hands of the kind of person who, as
Karl Marx brutally but justly said, 'makes a profession out of being a Christian'.
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